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The unconditional security in the creation of cryptographic keys obtained by quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols will induce a quantum leap in free-space communication privacy in the same way that we are beginning
to realize secure optical fiber connections. However, free-space channels, in particular those with long links and
the presence of atmospheric turbulence, are affected by losses, fluctuating transmissivity, and background light
that impair the conditions for secure QKD. Here we introduce a method to contrast the atmospheric turbulence
in QKD experiments. Our adaptive real time selection (ARTS) technique at the receiver is based on the selection
of the intervals with higher channel transmissivity. We demonstrate, using data from the Canary Island 143-km
free-space link, that conditions with unacceptable average quantum bit error rate which would prevent the
generation of a secure key can be used once parsed according to the instantaneous scintillation using the ARTS
technique.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.91.042320 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 42.68.Bz
I. INTRODUCTION
The transmissions of quantum states to a distant receiver,
which may be placed on a mobile terminal or on board of an
orbiting station, is the frontier of quantum communications
(QC) and of QC protocols that are based on the transmission
and detection of quantum bits, or qubits. As such, it has been
investigated by different groups [1–4] as well as included in
continental road maps for technology development, as in the
case of Europe [5], Japan [6], or China [7].
In free-space communications, background photons and
detector noise are unavoidable sources of quantum bit error
rate (QBER), which limits the range of quantum protocols.
Indeed, in the case of quantum key distribution (QKD),
an unconditional secret key may be generated only if the
QBER is below a given threshold. For this reason, free-space
QKD demonstrations have so far been realized typically
during dark nights or by using very narrow spectral filters
that impose a low key rate already on urban scale [8–17].
To overcome this limitation, a modeling of the probability
distribution for the transmission coefficient was exploited, in
order to devise a postselection technique for slowly fluctuating
channels [18,19]. The restriction to the analysis of the sifted
bit rate on a millisecond time scale was inspired by this
approach [20]. However, in the case of strong turbulence, due
to the inherent high losses the channel transmissivity cannot
be reliably estimated in the intrinsic time scale of its variation
by the received photons.
A different approach is found in the CAD1 and CAD2
distillation schemes [21], which represent a generalization
of Maurer’s advantage distillation technique [22]. Sequences
of correct (possibly nonconsecutive) sifted bits are joined
together and one single secure bit is distilled out of each
sequence. The length of each sequence should be chosen
according to a trade-off scheme, because longer sequences
allow one to distill keys with higher channel QBERs, but
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provide a lower key rate in the case of low QBERs. However,
in a turbulent, rapidly time-varying channel, the effectiveness
of such solutions would be limited by the difficulty of choosing
the suitable parameters of the distillation strategy according to
the varying QBER. Another generalization of the advantage
distillation in Ref. [22] was proposed in Ref. [23]: parities
for many pairs of bits are shared between Alice and Bob
along the public channel. Those pairs with nonmatching
parities are discarded, while the remaining ones (over which
the QBER is lower) are syndrome decoded. However, the
above-presented distillation methods do not take advantage
of the intrinsic QBER variability of the channels, as they rely
on the assumption that the channel maintains its QBER stable
long enough to allow optimization of their parameters.
Here, we devise a method that exploits strong atmospheric
turbulence for secret key generation, in conditions in which
the long-time average QBER is too high for secure communi-
cation. The temporal profile of the transmissivity in a long and
strongly turbulent channel has characteristic peaks lasting few
milliseconds, and following a lognormal distribution [24]. On
these grounds, we will introduce and demonstrate an adaptive
real time selection (ARTS) scheme, inspired by the experimen-
tal observations reported in Ref. [24], which were subsequently
analyzed numerically using the split-step method in Ref. [25].
The scheme is based on the estimation of the link transmissivity
over its intrinsic time scale by an auxiliary classical laser beam,
copropagating with the qubits, but conveniently interleaved in
time. In this way, the link scintillation is monitored in real time
and the high channel transmissivity intervals corresponding
to a viable QBER for a positive key generation rate can be
selected. We will present a demonstration of this protocol in
loss conditions that are equivalent to long distance and satellite
links, and with scintillation range corresponding to moderate
to severe weather.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The 143-km free-space channel between La Palma and
Tenerife Islands was used as the best available test bed for
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Experimental setup: Alice is located at JKT observatory in La Palma. Qubits are prepared using a field-programmable
gate array (FPGA) controller, linear optical components, and attenuated lasers. Alice telescope is also configured to acquire the beacon beam
sent by Bob, located at the Optical Ground Station in Tenerife, and used for tracking the transmitter in order to stabilize the pointing.
turbulence and long links, as sketched in Fig. 1. The transmitter
(Alice) was located at the JKT observatory on the island of La
Palma. At the transmitter side, qubits were made by using
strongly attenuated 850-nm lasers. In the same location we
also used a 30-mW classical laser beam (probe) at 808 nm to
estimate the link transmissivity using pulses of 100 μs duration
at 1 kHz repetition rate. The encoding of the quantum signal
was then obtained by controlling the lasers with an FPGA.
Classical and quantum beams were coupled into single mode
fibers and injected into a fiber beam coupler. The output was
sent to a Galilean telescope that we designed specifically with
a singlet aspheric lens of 230 mm diameter and 2200 mm
of focal length as the main component. The beam diameter
size of about 20 cm provided the required class-1M eye-safe
conditions for the free-space propagating beams. In vacuum,
the telescope would produce, after 143 km of propagation,
a spot comparable to the primary mirror of the receiving
telescope, in order to maximize the power transfer between the
two parties. To compensate the beam wandering induced by the
atmosphere, we implemented a feedback loop for controlling
the transmitting direction: the fiber delivering the signal to the
transmitter was mounted on an XYZ movable stage placed
close to the focal place of the 230-mm lens, with computer
controlled stepped motors. On this same stage, we mounted
a CCD sensor which acquired a green (532-nm) beacon laser
sent by Tenerife toward Alice telescope. The camera is placed
in order to measure an image of the singlet focal plane: the
wandering of the beacon on the CCD was then analyzed in real
time by a software that moves the XYZ stage to compensate
the movement of the beacon spot on the camera.
At the receiver part (Bob), in Tenerife, we used the 1-
m aperture telescope of the ESA Optical Ground Station to
receive the signals. After the Coude´ path, we collimated the
beam and we divided the classical and quantum signal by using
a dichroic mirror. The qubits were measured in two bases
and the counts detected by the two single-photon avalanche
photodiodes (SPADs) were stored on a FPGA. The probe beam
is detected by a high-bandwidth avalanche photodetector and
then registered and stored by an oscilloscope.
In order to measure the QBER of the channel, we used the
data structure optimized for free-space QKD implementation
based on a recent implementation of the B92 protocol [26,27].
A raw key is composed by N packets of 2880 bits each, sent at
the rate of 2.5 MHz; as regards the payload slots, Alice sends
two qubits separated by 200 ns. Due to communication con-
straints with the FPGA, each packet is sent every 20 ms result-
ing in an average sending rate of 150 kHz. The two FPGAs are
synchronized every second by a pulse-per-second (pps) signal
provided by two GPS receivers located in the two islands.
We point out that, at the transmitter side, the pulses contain
on average more than one photon, while at the receiver side
we work in the single-photon regime. Our aim, in fact, was to
simulate a possible realistic scenario where one would employ
fast (hundreds of MHz to GHz) free-space QKD systems which
are nowadays commonly available. Since our system has a
transmission rate of 2.5 MHz, the detected rate is comparable
to the rate observable with a transmitter emitting true single-
photon pulses with a repetition rate of about 1 GHz, assuming
that the amount of optical and atmospheric attenuation is fixed.
III. REALIZATION OF THE ARTS METHOD
In order to assess the correspondence between the intensity
of the probe beam and the number of photons received on the
quantum channel, the link transmissivity was estimated with a
fast photodiode on the probe signal. The single-photon stream
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Comparison between the counts detected
by the SPAD [green (dark) line] and the voltage measured by the fast
photodiode at the receiver [red (light) line]. In the inset we show a
zoomed detail of the acquisition (between 4.48 s and 5.54 s) in order
to better appreciate the correlation between the quantum and classical
signals. We chose a particular inset but in all the acquisitions the two
signals are correlated.
was detected by a SPAD and binned in 1 ms intervals. With
this measurement we demonstrate a good correlation between
the two signals, as shown in Fig. 2 for an acquisition time of
11 s.
To further demonstrate the correlation we performed the
ARTS method, consisting in the following procedure: given
a set of L packets (each of 1 ms length), we denote by Vi
the probe signal amplitude and by Si the number of detected
photons in the quantum signal for the ith packet. We set a
threshold value VT for the probe voltage and postselect only
those packets such that Vi > VT; in particular, we denote by
I(VT) = {i : Vi > VT} the indexes of the packets for which
the above condition holds and by NP(VT) the corresponding
number of packets, that is, NP(VT) = |{I(VT)}|. Furthermore,
we define the following quantities:
S(VT) =
∑
i∈I(VT)
Si, S(VT) = S(VT)
NP(VT)
(1)
with S(VT) representing the total number of detected bits and
S(VT) the mean number of detections per packet after the
postselection performed with threshold VT.
The effect of the ARTS procedure can be clearly appreciated
in Fig. 3, whereS(VT) (normalized to the mean counts obtained
without thresholding) is plotted (green line) as a function
of the threshold: a higher threshold value corresponds to a
larger mean number of counts per packet. This demonstrates
that the probe and quantum signal are correlated and one
can significantly improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) by
thresholding. Here we define the SNR as the ratio between
the overall signal (true signal and background) and the back-
ground. As a side effect, we observe that the preselection also
decreases the overall number of detections in the transmission
S(VT) as can be noticed by considering the ratio S(VT)/
S(VT = 0) (blue line).
We then apply the results previously described to a QKD
experiment. In particular, we show that, the thresholding gives,
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Mean counts per packet S(VT) (normal-
ized to the mean counts obtained without thresholding) and fraction
of total count S(VT)/S(VT = 0) in function of the probe threshold.
in some cases, benefits in terms of the secret key length, even
if the total number of sifted bits decrease. Indeed, when the
QBER is above the maximum value tolerable for QKD (11%
for the BB84 protocol) it is not possible to produce secure
keys. However, by the ARTS method we will reduce the QBER
below such limit, allowing secure key generation. We point out
that at the receiver the beam has a mean photon number per
pulse below 1, namely, it is the single-photon level.
First, given the number of errors Ei in the ith packet, we
define the overall number of errors E(VT) and the quantum bit
error rate Q(VT) in the postselected packets as
E(VT) =
∑
i∈I(VT)
Ei, Q(VT) = E(VT)
S(VT)
. (2)
For evaluating the impact of the ARTS procedure on
the performance of a quantum key distribution system, it
is important to study the two complementary effects of
thresholding: on one hand, a higher threshold increases the
mean detected bits per packet S(VT). On the other hand, it
decreases the total detections S(VT). Both effects influence
the achievable secret key rate of the system, and an optimal
trade-off should be found.
We first derive the expected number of sifted bits and
their bit error rate after thresholding. As demonstrated in
Ref. [24], the statistics of the transmission of a long free-space
channel follows a log-normal distribution. The measured probe
voltage at the receiver, being the transmitted intensity con-
stant, follows the same distribution, given by p(V ; mV ,σ 2) =
1√
2πσ
1
V
exp{−[(ln V
mV
+ 12σ 2)]2/(2σ 2)}. In the previous ex-
pression σ 2 is related to the mean mV and the variance vV of
the probe intensities distribution by σ 2 = ln(1 + vV
m2V
). As an
example, we show in Fig. 4 the distribution of the probabilities
of occurrence of different photodiode voltages corresponding
to different probe intensities as measured on the focal plane
of the receiver. The shown data are the same used in Fig. 2.
According to the theory [24,28], the probabilities follow a
log-normal distribution, as demonstrated by the continuous
(red) curve representing the log-normal fit.
In the following analysis, we assume that the number of
detected photons and the probe intensity have completely
correlated log-normal distributions [24]. This hypothesis
042320-3
GIUSEPPE VALLONE et al. PHYSICAL REVIEW A 91, 042320 (2015)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
σ =0.991, mV =0.992V
p(V ) = 1√
2πσ
1
V e
− [ ( ln VmV +
1
2 σ
2) ] 2/ ( 2σ 2)
Voltage (V)
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y
Statistics of the probe
FIG. 4. (Color online) Experimental occurrences of probe inten-
sities (measured by photodiode voltages) and log-normal fit.
implies that both distributions have the same parameter
σ 2. Then, we can predict the number of packets above
threshold NP(VT) and the number of sifted bits surviv-
ing the thresholding S(VT) in case of null background as
S(VT)/S(0) =
∫ +∞
VT
V
mV
p(V ; mV ,σ )dV and NP(VT)/NP(0) =∫ +∞
VT
p(V ; mV ,σ )dV . By taking into account the background
clicks we get
NP(VT) = NP(0)12
[
1 − erf
(
ln VT
mV
+ 12σ 2√
2σ 2
)]
,
S(VT) = nbNP(VT) + 12[S(0) − nbNP(0)]
×
[
1 − erf
(
ln VT
mV
− 12σ 2√
2σ 2
)]
, (3)
where nb is the average background count per packet. Indeed,
experimental data suggest that the hypothesis of complete
correlation between quantum and probe signals is not strictly
satisfied, and the previous expression turns out to be an
approximation of the measured values. Still, they allow one
to derive a postselection threshold that improves the secure
key rate, as shown in the following (e.g., in Fig. 5).
We now define a further predictive model for estimating the
bit error rate on the quantum channel as a function of the probe
threshold. Let us assume that the average bit error rate on the
quantum channel is mQ and that the number of counts per
packet due to background noise is nb. Now, since background
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Experimental QBER (Qexp) and secure
key rate (Rexp) in functions of the probe threshold (measured by the
photodiode voltage). Dashed and solid lines show the corresponding
theoretical predictions (Qth and Rth, respectively).
photons are not polarized, the corresponding bit error rate is
1/2, and we can write the predicted quantum bit error rate Qth
as a function of the threshold VT, namely,
Qth(VT) = mQ
(
1 − nbS(VT)
)
+ 1
2
nb
S(VT)
, (4)
Given these quantities, the asymptotic key rate of a QKD
system based on the BB84 protocol [29] and the ARTS
procedure (namely, the probe thresholding mechanism) reads
as follows:
R(VT) = S(VT)
S(0) {1 − 2h2[Q(VT)]}. (5)
It is worth noting that using the asymptotic rate instead of
the finite-length one [30,31], may be considered a restrictive
approach, especially because the postselection further reduces
the number of available sifted bits. However, it is sufficient
to choose the size of the blocks before key distillation (i.e.,
information reconciliation and privacy amplification) large
enough such that, without loss of generality, the asymptotic
bound provides a reasonable approximation of the actual rate.
In Fig. 5, we finally compare the theoretical (solid lines) and
the experimental values (circles and crosses) of the measured
QBER and the asymptotic key rate as a function of the
probe intensity threshold in a data acquisition. The theoretical
curves for the QBER and for the key rate were obtained by
substituting in Eqs. (4) and (5) the estimates for the log-normal
parameters mV and σ 2 of the probe signal distribution. The
other two parameters, S(0) and NP(0), needed for predicting
S(T ) and NP(T ), are directly measured (they correspond to
the total sifted bits and the total number of packets received,
respectively).
The data shown in Fig. 5 correspond to an acquisition of
5 × 105 sifted bits in condition of high background, simulated
by a thermal light source turned on in the receiver laboratory.
The intensity of the background was chosen in order to obtain
a mean QBER larger than 11%. In particular, we measured
an average value of nb = 35.17 for the background clicks per
packet and we assume mQ = 5.6 × 10−2. As clearly shown
in the figure, Eq. (4) provides a good approximation of the
experimental curve.
Figure 5 also shows that there is a strong correspondence
between the shape of the theoretical rate, Rth, and the measured
rate, Rexpt.. The fact that the experimental points do not fit
the expected curve can be ascribed to the discrepancy in the
empirical joint distribution of probe intensities and counts with
respect to the model; in particular, we measured the following
fitting parameters for the normalized log-normal distributions:
σ 2V = 0.967 for the probe intensities and σ 2S = 0.716 for the
photon signal. However, the derivation of the optimal threshold
for maximizing the secret key length (magenta dashed line)
from the probe distribution yields the optimal VT also for the
experimental data. In particular, the optimal threshold inferred
from the probe distribution is V (th)T ,opt = 375 mV, and coincides
with the one resulting from optimization on the experimental
data, yielding a rate of R(V (th)T ,opt) = 5.55 × 10−2.
We observe that, in the case of VT < 70 mV, it is not
possible to generate a secure key, being the QBER is higher
than the theoretical maximum (i.e., Q = 11%). By increasing
042320-4
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Comparison between the rates achievable by the ARTS, the postselection, and the standard QKD technique (no
selection). We assumed that the channel QBER is 3% and the log-normal parameter is σ = 1, similar to the parameter we measured in the
tested free-space channel. The parameter m represents the mean received bits per coherence time of the channel.
the threshold value above 70 mV a nonzero secret key rate
is achieved. With the optimal threshold value, the measured
QBER is Q(V (th)T ,opt) = 8.38 × 10−2; a significant improvement
with respect to the initial value, Q(0) = 13.14 × 10−2, is
therefore achieved. Finally, we observe that for increasing
values of VT > V (th)T ,opt the QBER still decreases, but so does
the rate, since the reduction in the residual number of sifted
bits does not compensate the advantage obtained from the
lower QBER. This result is of absolute practical relevance, as
it shows that leveraging the probe intensity information is an
enabling factor for quantum key distribution, allowing one to
distill a secret key.
As for the security of this postselection approach as applied
to a QKD system, no advantage is given to a potential attacker
in the true single-photon regime, since the thresholding is
nothing but a further sifting step on the received bits [21,23].
If the attacker tried to force Alice and Bob to postselect a
particular bit, in fact, she would alter the probe signal before
the disclosure of the preparation bases on the public channel,
and, therefore, before she could actually know if her measured
bit is correct. On the other hand, altering the probe statistics
or interrupting the probe transmission would not yield any
advantage to the attacker, as it would just break the correlation
between the quantum and the classical signal and would thus
result in a denial of service attack. The security analysis gets
more involved if we allow photon number splitting (PNS)
attacks. In that case, the attacker may force Bob to receive
just the qubits for which the PNS attack was successful,
i.e., only those pulses with multiple photons. A decoy state
protocol may counteract this strategy, but its effectiveness
with a turbulent and loss varying free-space channel has to be
investigated.
IV. COMPARISON WITH THE POSTSELECTION
ON RECEIVED BITS
The ARTS method can be compared with the technique
introduced in Ref. [20], where a postselection is performed
when the number of received bits is above a given threshold.
The postselection is effective only when the threshold is
set in order to get at least several bits for coherence time
of the channel: in fact, only in this condition is it possible
to postselect the correct instants of high transmissivity. By
coherence time of the channel we denote the time (typically of
the order of few milliseconds) in which the transmissivity
of the channel can be considered constant. In the case of
very turbulent channel and extreme environmental conditions
(say mist or high humidity), the number of received bits per
channel coherence time may not exceed the value of 10: in this
case, the postselection cannot be implemented and only the
ARTS method remains effective. This result is confirmed by
the following analysis. We performed a simulation to compare
the two techniques by assuming that the probe and the signal
statistics are perfectly correlated. The rates achievable in the
two cases are shown in Fig. 6, demonstrating that the ARTS
methods always outperform the postselection on the received
sifted bits, and it is particularly effective when the number of
mean sifted bits received per coherence time of the channel
are below ∼10 and the SNR is below 20.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we demonstrated a proof of principle
of a method that mitigates the detrimental effects of the
atmospheric turbulence in QKD. The method exploits the
fluctuating transmissivity of the channel for allowing QC
where not possible with standard approaches. The ARTS
method is easily integrable in QKD systems and is based on
the sampling with a probe signal sent on the same channel of
the qubits. By setting a threshold in the intensity of the probe at
the receiver, it is possible to select in real time the lags of high
channel transmissivity which correspond to acceptable QBER
values. Indeed, we proved that with the ARTS method we were
able to decrease the measured QBER and to extract secret keys
in adverse conditions, when the initial average QBER is above
the security threshold of 11%.
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